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Abstract. This paper describes in detail the example introduced in the
preliminary evaluation of THRIVE. Specifically, it evaluates THRIVE
over an abstraction of the ground model proposed for a critical com-
ponent belonging to a medical device used by optometrists and ophtal-
mologits to dected visual problems.
We provide the full description of the example introduced in the preliminary
evaluation of [2]. Specifically, we evaluate THRIVE over an abstraction of the
ground model proposed in [1], a critical component belonging to a medical de-
vice used by optometrists and ophtalmologits to dected visual problems. In the
following we describe the considered partial model, the property of interest and
the deductive verification procedure performed by THRIVE over the incomplete
model.
Partial model. The ground model proposed in [1] is a critical component
that measures the stereoacuity of young patients. The criticality of the system
resides in certifying a certain level of stereoacuity in a consistent way, such that
the treatment given by the doctor to his/her patient is correct.
We provide in Figure 1 the complete Partial Kripke Structure that represents
the system. In each state the propositions are indicated with their truth value.
In the complete version proposed in [1] all propositions had a true/false value.
Note that, in this abstracted version, in the states s6 and s7 the propositions
related to the assessed level have an unknown value, meaning that the designer
is currently not sure on whether the propositions should be true or false in
these states.
The propositions fl and cert that are specified on the side of each state are
the complement-closed version of fl and cert. These propositions are used by
THRIVE during the computation of the intersection of the model states with
the property states.
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Fig. 1: Model M
Property. The property of interest is expressed by the LTL formula ψ3 =
(edb → (cert∨ fl)), which states that, if an error has been made by the
patient (edb) he/she cannot be uncertified and be at the second level (¬fl).
Indeed, a mistake prevents a patient from increasing the assessed level. Figure 2
represents the Büchi automaton corresponding to ¬ψ3.
q0 q2q1
true
cert ∧ fl ∧ ebd cert ∧ fl 
cert ∧ fl 
Fig. 2: The automaton A¬ψ3
Running THRIVE. First, the framework performs a classical model check-
ing run on the pessimistic approximation (generated by assigning ⊥ to the propo-
sitions fl and sl in the mentioned two states of the model). This particular as-
signment allows the system to reach the accepting state of the negated property
q2 in which holds η(q2) = (¬cert∧¬fl). The returned counterexample cor-
responds to the path s0, s2, s5, sω7 on the states of the model, and to the path
〈s0, q0〉, 〈s2, q0〉, 〈s5, q0〉, 〈s7, q0〉, 〈s7, q1〉, 〈s7, q2〉ω on the states of the intersec-
tion space Mpes ⊗ A¬ψ3 . The generated accepting loop leads to conclude that
Mpes 6|= ψ3.
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s0, q0
s1, q0 s2, q0
s3, q0 s4, q0
s5, q0
s6, q0 s7, q0
s1, q1 s2, q1 s3, q1 s4, q1 s5, q1 s6, q1 s7, q1
Fig. 3: The intersection automaton Mopt ⊗A¬ψ3
The framework therefore performs another model checking run on the opti-
mistic approximation (assigning > to the unknown propositions fl and sl). This
time the intersection state space does not contain any accepting behavior with
respect to the negation of property ψ3. The intersection space is represented
in Figure 3. Table 1 presents a formal proof which shows that the optimistic
approximation satisfies the property under analysis.
Table 1: Proof that ψ3 is not violated.
Step Component Rule
Fail 〈s1, q1〉,
〈s2, q1〉,
〈s3, q1〉,
〈s4, q1〉,
〈s5, q1〉,
〈s6, q1〉,
〈s7, q1〉
s1 ∈ F(Iopt)
s2 ∈ F(Iopt)
s3 ∈ F(Iopt)
s4 ∈ F(Iopt)
s5 ∈ F(Iopt)
s6 ∈ F(Iopt)
s7 ∈ F(Iopt)
s1 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s2 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s3 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s4 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s5 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s6 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
s7 |= µ(q1) = ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl)
Induction X1 = {〈s6, q0〉},
Exit(X1) = {〈s6, q1〉}
s6 |= µ(q1)
s6 → {s6}
s6 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
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Induction X2 = {〈s7, q0〉},
Exit(X2) = {〈s7, q1〉}
s7 |= µ(q1)
s7 → {s7}
s7 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Induction X3 = {〈s3, q0〉},
Exit(X3) = {〈s3, q1〉}
s3 |= µ(q1)
s3 → {s3}
s3 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Induction X4 = {〈s4, q0〉},
Exit(X4) = {〈s4, q1〉}
s4 |= µ(q1)
s4 → {s4}
s4 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Induction X5 = {〈s1, q0〉},
Exit(X5) = {〈s1, q1〉}
s1 |= µ(q1)
s1 → {s1}
s1 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Successors 〈s5, q0〉
s5 → {s6, s7}
s6 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s7 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s5 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Successors 〈s2, q0〉
s2 → {s3, s4}
s3 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s4 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s2 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Successors 〈s0, q0〉
s0 → {s1, s2}
s1 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s2 |= µ(q0)∧µ(q1)
s0 |= µ(q0) = (edb→ (cert∨ fl))
Conclusion s0 |= µ(q0)⇒ s0 |= ψ3 ⇒M |= ψ3
The proof can be started by showing first that the system trivially models
the property in the states in which ¬edb∨ (cert∨ fl) holds (the fail axiom is
applied). Starting from these states, where the model satisfies the property, by
using first the induction rule then the successors rule, the proof traverses the au-
tomaton until it reaches the initial state. All the premises lead to conclude that it
satisfies the µ(q0) sub-formula. By construction of the proof [3], we can conclude
that s0 models the property, i.e., Mopt |= (edb → (cert∨ fl)). According to
the three-valued model checking algorithm, the result of the procedure is maybe,
therefore the satisfaction of the property depends on the truth value that will
be assigned to the proposition fl in the two uncertain states.
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